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Non-Technical Summary 
 
Why do we rely on the use of money? A traditional view is that monetary systems overcome 
barter and intertemporal trade frictions. A more recent view suggests that money makes up for 
a lack of enforcement, external or not. Simply put, money has value only if, by exchanging it, we 
outperform equilibria based on rules of voluntary behavior. According to monetary theorists, 
we trade money for goods and labor instead of promising to exchange favors over time, only if 
such promises are hollow. This is especially true in large anonymous societies, such as modern 
ones, where it is difficult to monitor and sanction undesirable behaviors, and so norms of 
voluntary behavior cannot be easily enforced. In the standard monetary model, money 
overcomes such incentive-compatibility problems because some enforcement hard-wired into 
the model: monetary trade is assumed quid-pro-quo. 
 
In this paper we remove all external enforcement and study monetary exchange as the result 
of a self-enforcing cooperative process. In equilibrium, anonymous agents voluntarily transfer 
goods or money to counterparties only if there are sufficient incentives to maintain this trading 
scheme in the future. We demonstrate that monetary equilibrium cannot generally be 
sustained without some enforcement, external or not. In particular, monetary equilibrium 
collapses if monitoring and punishment limitations hinder enforcement, and this is especially 
true in large economies with private monitoring. The message is that money and enforcement 
are complementary institutions. 
 
This leads us to hypothesize that the monitoring difficulties due to the growth in size of human 
settlements over the course of history might have provided a push  towards adoption of 
monetary exchange in those communities equipped with effective enforcement institutions, 
and not in societies that lacked such institutions—as current thinking would instead suggest. Game-Theoretic Foundations
of Monetary Equilibrium∗
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ESI, Chapman University Goethe University Frankfurt
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Abstract
Monetary theorists have advanced an intriguing notion: we exchange money to
make up for a lack of enforcement, when it is diﬃcult to monitor and sanc-
tion opportunistic behaviors. We demonstrate that, in fact, monetary equilib-
rium cannot generally be sustained when monitoring and punishment limitations
preclude enforcement—external or not. Simply put, monetary systems cannot
operate independently of institutions—formal or informal—designed to monitor
behaviors and sanction undesirable ones. This fundamental result is derived by
integrating monetary theory with the theory of repeated games, studying mon-
etary equilibrium as the outcome of a matching game with private monitoring.
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11 Introduction
Why do societies rely on money? The traditional view is that monetary
systems overcome barter and intertemporal trade frictions [10]. A recent
view is that money makes up for a lack of enforcement in society: money
has value if, by exchanging it, we outperform equilibria based on rules of
voluntary behavior [1, 7, 9].
To develop this idea, imagine a group of strangers facing repeated op-
portunities to aid someone else, at a cost. Payoﬀs are maximized if everyone
helps. However, monitoring is diﬃcult, direct reciprocation is impossible,
no one can self-commit to actions, and no coercion is possible: any help
is voluntary. Establishing a norm of mutual support requires trust that
help today will be later returned by strangers, which calls for enforcement
of defections [6, 8]. Monetary trade requires none of this—argue mone-
tary theorists: we exchange help for money instead of promises of future
help because we cannot monitor and cannot sanction, individually or col-
lectively, opportunistic behavior. What incentives can monetary systems
provide that norms of voluntary behavior cannot reproduce?
We answer this question by adopting analysis techniques from the lit-
erature on repeated matching games to study monetary exchange. Such
methodological innovation allows us to demonstrate that money cannot
generally make up for a lack of enforcement (external or not) in society.
2In fact, monetary equilibrium collapses if monitoring and punishment lim-
itations hinder individual and group enforcement. In particular, without
enforcement of spot trades monetary exchange cannot be sustained in large
anonymous economies, i.e., the economies that are the bread and butter of
monetary models.
In the model, a stable population of anonymous players is randomly
divided in pairs in each period. In every encounter one subject can pro-
vide a beneﬁt to the other by sustaining a small cost (= make a voluntary
transfer). This interaction is inﬁnitely repeated [3, 4]. Since players can-
not build reputations and cannot adopt relational contracts, there is an
incentive to behave opportunistically and avoid making transfers. May
the introduction of symbolic objects (=tokens) support an outcome that is
socially preferred?
Monetary theorists have oﬀered a positive answer by imposing quid-pro-
quo constraints: any transfer requires a concurrent payment, or else it fails.1
In a simultaneous-moves game this amounts to assuming away any temp-
tation to defect (= give nothing) by imposing mechanical punishment (=
get nothing), so if money has value, monetary trade is incentive-compatible
by design. Quid-pro-quo is a form of external enforcement: it converts the
social dilemma into a coordination game by restricting the outcome set.
1E.g., see the survey in [10]; the “no-commitment trading mechanism” in [9], which
embeds a technology that ﬁlters out outcomes that are not mutually desirable; the
trading mechanism in [1].
3What if we do not restrict outcomes in a match? Agents might not
voluntarily deliver their “quid,” even if they get the “quo.” In sequential
equilibrium, such opportunistic behavior must be deterred with proper
dynamic incentives. The result that money sustains exchange without
enforcement—external or not—is thus overturned. All we need is a suf-
ﬁciently large economy with poor monitoring; Folk-theorem type results
for matching games reveal that even if everyone sanctions a defection by
forever defecting, such community enforcement cannot deter opportunistic
behavior in large groups [6, 8].
Our ﬁnding that money cannot single-handedly make up for a lack of
enforcement in society is unique. It is meaningful because it provides a
theoretical foundation for the notion that monetary exchange cannot oper-
ate as a stand-alone institution to overcome trade frictions. The option to
exchange symbolic objects for goods does not per se remove opportunistic
temptations, so monetary trade must be supported by enforcement institu-
tions, formal (=external) or informal. This leads us to hypothesize that the
monitoring diﬃculties due to the growth in size of human settlements over
the course of history, might have provided a push towards adoption of mon-
etary exchange in those communities equipped with eﬀective enforcement
institutions, and not in societies that lacked such institutions—as current
thinking would instead suggest.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model and reports
4the main Theorem, which is proved in Section 3. Section 4 oﬀers some ﬁnal
remarks.
2 A model of intertemporal exchange
Consider an economy populated by N = 2n ≥ 4 inﬁnitely-lived agents who
face a social dilemma [3, 4]. An exogenous matching process partitions the
population into n pairs in each period t = 0,1,.... Pairings are random,
equally likely, independent over time, and last only one period. Let oi(t) ̸= i
be agent i’s opponent (or partner) in period t.
In each pair {i,oi(t)}, a coin ﬂip assigns the role of buyer to one agent,
and seller to the other. Hence, in each period an agent is equally likely
to either be a seller meeting a buyer, or a buyer meeting a seller. The
buyer has no action to take. The seller can choose C or D; C is interpreted
voluntarily transferring a good; Figure 1 reports the payoﬀ matrix, where
g − d − l > 0 and −l ≤ 0 ≤ d < g.2
Seller
C D
Buyer g, d − l d , d
Figure 1: Interaction in a match
Notes: Row player is a buyer, column player is a seller. Payoﬀs to (buyer, seller).
The outcome C is called gift-giving: the buyer earns surplus g − d
2E.g., sellers have a perishable good, and buyers derive greater utility than sellers from
consuming goods.
5and the seller’s surplus loss is −l. The outcome D is called autarky, as
it generates no trade surplus. Deﬁne the (socially) eﬃcient outcome in a
match as the one in which, giving equal weight to players, total surplus is
maximized. Gift-giving is eﬃcient, because g−d−l > 0, but is not mutually
beneﬁcial, because buyers beneﬁt at the expense of sellers. Autarky is the
unique Nash equilibrium of a one-shot interaction.
Now consider inﬁnite repetition of such interaction. It is assumed that,
in each t, each agent in {i,oi(t)}, for i = 1,...,N, observes only the out-
come in their match (=private monitoring). The identity of oi(t) and the
outcome in other pairs are unobservable, so players cannot recognize past
opponents if they meet them again (= anonymity). These assumptions
imply that agents can neither build a reputation nor engage in relational
contracting—a standard assumption in monetary theory.
Payoﬀs in the repeated game are the sum of period-payoﬀs, discounted
by a common factor β ∈ [0,1).3 In the repeated game, the eﬃcient outcome
corresponds to the one in which total surplus is maximized in each match,
and in each period. We call this outcome “gift-giving” because it involves
an inﬁnite sequence of unilateral transfers.
Consider a strategy described by a two-state automaton with states
“active” and “idle.” The agent takes actions only as a seller. At the start
3Equivalently, let the economy be of indeﬁnite duration where β is the time-invariant
probability that, after each period the economy continues for one additional period,
while with probability 1 − β, the economy ends.
6of any date, if seller i is active, he selects C, and otherwise D. Agent i is
active on date t = 0, and in all t ≥ 1 (i) if agent i is active, then i becomes
idle in t + 1 only if the seller in {i,oi(t)} chooses D. Otherwise, agent i
remains active; (ii) There is no exit from the idle state. If everyone adopts
this strategy, then the entire group participates in enforcing defections,
and gift-giving is a sequential equilibrium if N is suﬃciently small [1].
Otherwise, community enforcement does not represent a suﬃcient deterrent
[6, 8]. So, let us add ﬁat money to study if its use can solve such enforcement
problems.
2.1 The game with money
A random fraction m =
M
N
∈ (0,1) of agents is initially endowed with one
indivisible, intrinsically worthless token. As is standard in the literature,
token holdings are observable, and cannot exceed one [1]. The introduction
of tokens expands action sets: in addition to others choices he may have, a
player with a token must also decide to either keep the token or to give it to
his opponent. The left panel in Figure 2 illustrates the game in a monetary
match, deﬁned as a meeting where only the buyer has a token. All other
meetings are called non-monetary. Players simultaneously choose actions.
Adding tokens does not eliminate any outcomes possible when M = 0:
to see this, consider strategies that ignore tokens, which brings us back to
Figure 1. Adding tokens expands the strategy set. Consider a strategy
7Seller
C D
give g,(d − l)⋆ d,d⋆
Buyer
keep g⋆,d − l d⋆,d
Seller
C D
give g,(d − l)⋆ d⋆,d
keep d⋆,d d⋆,d
Figure 2: Monetary match with and without quid-pro-quo constraint
Notes: Left panel: stage game in a monetary match. Payoﬀs (row, column) are not
aﬀected by the buyer’s action because tokens have no intrinsic value; the ⋆ by a player’s
payoﬀ denotes token possession at the end of the interaction. The right panel shows
how outcomes change when the quid-pro-quo constraint is imposed, making unilateral
transfers impossible.
that can support monetary exchange. Following [6], we represent it using
a two-state automaton.
Deﬁnition 1 (Monetary trade strategy). At the start of any period t,
agent i can be “active” or “idle:” when active and in a monetary match, i
transfers his inventory to oi(t); otherwise, i makes no transfer. The agent
starts active on t = 0; in all t ≥ 1
• If agent i is active, then i becomes idle in t + 1 only if {i,oi(t)} is a
monetary match where someone makes no transfer. Otherwise, agent
i remains active.
• There is no exit from the idle condition.
We call monetary trade the outcome that results when everyone adopts
the strategy in Deﬁnition 1. Under monetary trade transfers occur only
in monetary matches–the seller selects “C” and the buyer selects “give.”
These actions are simultaneous and voluntary. There are no transfers in
all other matches because a seller selects “C” only if the buyer has a token,
and a buyer with a token selects “give” only if the seller has no token.
8Monetary trade has two components: a rule of desirable behavior (=
equilibrium) and a rule of punishment to be followed if a departure from
desirable behavior is observed (= oﬀ equilibrium). Players start by mak-
ing transfers in all monetary matches, but stop forever after observing a
deviation. Such switch to a “punishment mode” is absent from monetary
models, which impose quid-pro-quo constraints: every transfer requires a
concurrent payment, and unilateral transfers are impossible.4 This is not
an innocuous assumption. It removes from the outcome set any outcome
that is not mutually beneﬁcial, which changes the nature of the game, from
a social dilemma to a pure coordination game with Pareto-ranked outcomes
(Figure 2). Ruling out opportunistic temptations in this manner amounts
to assuming an institution for the enforcement of spot trades. Our model
lifts this restriction—money does not embody an enforcement technology—
hence players must rely on informal enforcement to sustain intertemporal
exchange.
2.2 Monetary equilibrium
Conjecture that monetary trade is an equilibrium. Consider an agent with
j = 0,1 tokens at the start of a period. Deﬁne the probability m0 that
someone without money randomly meets a buyer with a token, and the
probability 1−m1 that someone with money randomly meets a seller with-
4The monetary trade strategy in the literature is: after any history, the agent in a
monetary match makes an unconditional transfer, and no transfer otherwise. Autarky
is the outcome in any match where a departure from this strategy occurs; see [1, 3, 9].
9out a token. Since being a seller or a buyer in a meeting is equally likely,
and independent of money holdings, we have
m0 :=
1
2
×
M
N − 1
for M ≤ N − 1,
1 − m1 :=
1
2
×
N − M
N − 1
for M ≥ 1.
Recursive arguments imply that the start-of-period equilibrium payoﬀ vj
satisﬁes
v0 = m0 (d − l + βv1) + (1 − m0)(d + βv0),
v1 = m1 (d + βv1) + (1 − m1)(g + βv0).
(1)
Lemma 1. We have v1 > v0 always, and v0 ≥
d
1 − β
if
β ≥ βm :=
l
(1 − m1)(g − d) + m1l
∈ (0,1).
Proof of Lemma 1. In Appendix
β ≥ βm is necessary for existence of monetary equilibrium: payoﬀs must be
above that ensured by permanent autarky
d
1 − β
, which is always an equi-
librium. However, it is not suﬃcient because players can suﬀer involuntary
losses.
Theorem 1 (Existence of monetary equilibrium). There exists (l∗,β∗) ∈
[0,g −d)×(βm,1) such that for (l,β) ∈ [l∗,g −d)×[β∗,1) monetary trade
is a sequential equilibrium. Monetary trade is not a sequential equilibrium
as N → ∞.
Given the lack of enforcement technologies, monetary exchange must rely
on some form on community enforcement of defections. Voluntary transfers
10are made today only if there are suﬃcient incentives (i) to avoid commu-
nity enforcement in the future (the requirement on β) and (ii) to partic-
ipate in community enforcement if someone deviates (the requirement l).
Hence, in the absence of enforcement technologies, monetary exchange is
self-sustaining only if punishment can spread quickly in the economy. But
this is impossible if the group is too large. Before turning to the proof of
this theorem, it is helpful to contrast its ﬁndings with the standard result
in the monetary literature.
Proposition 1 (Monetary equilibrium with external enforcement).
Assume quid-pro-quo. Monetary equilibrium is supported for all β ∈ [βm,1)
and for any N.
Here, no agent can sustain (in)voluntary losses, so opportunistic behavior
is assumed away. That is, some enforcement has been introduced, e.g.,
an institution that enforces private property rights. So, there is no need
for community enforcement and we consider a simple history-independent
strategy: in a monetary match, players make transfers (money or goods)
conditional on receiving a concurrent transfer; otherwise sellers choose D,
and buyers do not make transfers. Monetary trade is incentive compatible
if the seller’s loss is small relative to the beneﬁt expected from spending
the token in the future. All we need is suﬃciently patient players, β ≥ βm;
see [1].
The rest of the paper constructs the proof of Theorem 1 by studying
11the incentives to make voluntary transfers in equilibrium (=cooperate) and
to punish oﬀ equilibrium (=defect). We start by studying how punishment
spreads oﬀ equilibrium, and proceed by calculating oﬀ-equilibrium payoﬀs.
3 Oﬀ-equilibrium punishment and payoﬀs
Consider the start of an arbitrary period t in which the economy is or goes
oﬀ the (monetary) equilibrium path. Following well-established terminol-
ogy in repeated games, we refer to active agents as cooperators as opposed
to defectors, who are idle. Suppose the population is partitioned into N −k
cooperators and k = 1,...,N defectors. For k ≥ 2 the economy is oﬀ the
equilibrium path. Let k = 1 denote the case in which someone defects for
the ﬁrst time in a monetary match, moving the economy oﬀ equilibrium.
Let
k ∈ κ := (1,...,N)
T
denote the state of the economy at the start of a generic date and deﬁne
the N−dimensional column vector ek with 1 in the kth position and 0
everywhere else (T = transpose).5
It can be shown that, in this case, the probability distribution of defec-
5To be precise, k = 1 denotes the state of the economy after matching takes place in
equilibrium, when someone defects in a monetary match. This slight abuse in notation
is made for convenience. Also note that we use yj ∈ y := (y1,...,yN) to denote a
generic element of vector y.
12tors t ≥ 1 periods forward is given by eT
kQt where
Q =

 


 



0 1 0 0 0 0 ... 0 0
0 Q22 Q23 Q24 0 0 ... 0 0
0 0 Q33 Q34 Q35 Q36 ... 0 0
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . . ...
. . .
. . .
0 0 0 0 0 0 ... QN−1,N−1 QN−1,N
0 0 0 0 0 0 ... 0 1

 


 



is an N × N transition matrix with elements Qkk′ satisfying Qkk < 1 for
all k < N.
When everyone follows the strategy in Deﬁnition 1, the upper-triangular
matrix Q describes how contagious punishment spreads from period to pe-
riod, i.e., how the economy transitions from a state with k ∈ κ to k′ ∈ κ
defectors. This type of community enforcement has four main properties [5,
Theorem 1]. First, it is irreversible and contagious: If someone defects to-
day, then tomorrow there cannot be less defectors than today. The number
of additional defectors depends on the random matching outcome.6 Since
defection is an absorbing state, the number of defectors expected on any
date is greater if we start with more defectors, and can only increase over
time. A single defection eventually leads to 100% defections, an absorbing
state that is reached in ﬁnite time almost surely.
Suppose there are k ≥ 2 defectors. Let vj(k), j = 0,1, be the payoﬀ
to a generic defector i at the start of t when k = 2,...,N. To construct
vj(k), we must compute earnings/losses that i expects in t, and so we
6Q12 = 1 by deﬁnition. The ﬁrst line of Q represents the case when someone defects in
a monetary match, in equilibrium.
13must consider all possible encounters in which i may take part. Indeed, i’s
opponent in period t, oi(t), may or may not be a cooperator, and may or
may not have money. We also must compute i’s continuation payoﬀs in each
possible encounter {i,oi(t)}. Such payoﬀs depend on money holdings of i,
and the number of defectors k′ in the continuation game, which depends on
the outcome in the match {i,oi(t)} and all other matches. For this reason
it is convenient to proceed by considering the probability of each possible
encounter {i,oi(t)} that is conditional on reaching a speciﬁc k′ ≥ k, where
Qkk′ is the probability of reaching k′ starting from k ≥ 2.
We construct v0(k), the payoﬀ to defector i when he has no money at
the start of date t. Consider any outcome in t leading to k′ ≥ k defectors
in the continuation game. Focus on a match between defector i and oi(t).
Conditional on k′ being the state on t + 1 and k being the state on t, let
α0
kk′ denote the probability that, on date t, oi(t) is a cooperating buyer with
money when i has no money (the 0 superscript).7 Hence, with probability
α0
kk′ agent i gains a token and earns d; with complementary probability
1−α0
kk′ agent i either meets a defecting buyer who has money or is not in a
monetary match, and in either of these circumstances i does not receive a
7α0
kk = 0 because, if the state does not change (k′ = k), then it must be the case that
no idle seller meets a buyer who cooperates. The probability α0
kk′ depends on the
distribution of money across defectors.
14token and earns d. Using a recursive formulation for k = 2,...,N we have
v0(k) =
N ∑
k′=k
Qkk′{α
0
kk′[d + βv1(k
′)] + (1 − α
0
kk′)[d + βv0(k
′)]}
= d + β
N ∑
k′=k
Qkk′v0(k
′) + β
N ∑
k′=k
Qkk′α
0
kk′[v1(k
′) − v0(k
′)]. (2)
We have v0(N) =
d
1 − β
because α0
Nk′ = 0 for all k′ (it is impossible to meet
a cooperator when everyone is a defector). In addition, since v1(k) ≥ v0(k)
for all k (which we show later), we also have v0(k) ≥ v0(N) = va for all
k = 2,...,N.
The payoﬀ to someone who has no money and defects in equilibrium is
v0(1) = d + βv1(2),
which follows from the fact that Q12 = 1 and α0
12 = 1 by deﬁnition (if a
seller is the ﬁrst player to defect, k = 1, then he must defect in a monetary
match, in which case he surely meets a cooperating buyer and we transition
to k′ = 2).
Now, we construct v1(k), i.e., the payoﬀ to defector i when he has money
at the start of t. Consider any outcome in t leading to k′ ≥ k defectors in the
continuation game starting on t+1. Conditional on reaching k′ and k being
the current state, let α1
kk′ denote the probability that oi(t) is a cooperating
seller without money.8 Hence, with probability α1
kk′ agent i keeps his token
and earns g; with complementary probability 1 − α1
kk′, defector i either
8Here α1
kk = 0 because, by deﬁnition, no defector meets a cooperator in this case.
15meets a defecting seller who has no money, or is not in a monetary match,
and in either case, i keeps the token and earns d. Consequently for k =
2,...,N we have
v1(k) =
N ∑
k′=k
Qkk′{α
1
kk′[g + βv1(k
′)] + (1 − α
1
kk′)[d + βv1(k
′)]}
= σkg + (1 − σk)d + β
N ∑
k′=k
Qkk′v1(k
′). (3)
The second line above follows from observing that—when there are k de-
fectors in the economy—the unconditional probability that i (who has a
token) is in a monetary match with a cooperating seller is
σk :=
N ∑
k′=k
Qkk′α
1
kk′ =
N ∑
k′=k+1
Qkk′α
1
kk′ for k = 2,...,N. (4)
We have σk ≥ σh if h ≥ k (with more defectors, meeting cooperators is less
likely).
It is convenient to deﬁne σ1 = 1 and the vector
σ = (σ1,σ2,...,σN−1,0)
T.
For k ≥ 2, each element σk deﬁnes the probability that buyer i is in a
monetary match and meets a cooperator, given that i is one of k defectors
at the start of a period. It should be clear that 0 = σN < σk′ < σk < σ1 = 1
for 2 ≤ k < k′ ≤ N − 1. Also, deﬁne
v1(1) = g + βv1(2),
16as the payoﬀ to a buyer who is in monetary match in equilibrium, and
defects. Deﬁne
ϕk = (1 − β)e
T
k(I − βQ)
−1σ for k = 1,...,N.
Following [5], it can be interpreted as the expected number of cooperators
without money that a defector with money meets in the continuation game,
normalized by (1 − β)−1.
Lemma 2. We have
v1(k) =
1
1 − β
[ϕkg + (1 − ϕk)d] for k = 1,...,N, (5)
with v1(k) non-increasing in k and lim
β→1−
ϕk
1 − β
< ∞.
The proof immediately follows from [5, Theorem 2]. Having character-
ized payoﬀs in and out of equilibrium, we can now study deviations in and
out of equilibrium.
3.1 Equilibrium deviations
Suppose everyone has been active until period t and in period t + 1 agent
i deviates, reverting to play the monetary trade strategy on t+2. Agent i
meets cooperator oi(t) who may or may not have money.
In a non-monetary match, player i does not deviate by making a trans-
fer. Doing so is suboptimal because i has a loss but no future gain (contin-
uation payoﬀs do not change because his opponent remains active). Hence,
consider a monetary match in equilibrium. Two cases may occur:
17• i has no money and oi(t) is a buyer with money. If i deviates by
choosing D, then i receives money and his opponent becomes idle.
Such deviation is suboptimal if
d + βv1(2) ≤ d − l + βv1. (6)
• i has money and oi(t) is a seller without money. If i keeps his token,
then he obtains g and oi(t) becomes idle. Such deviation is subopti-
mal if
g + βv1(2) ≤ g + βv0. (7)
Lemma 3 (No deviations in equilibrium). There exists a value β∗ < 1
such that (6)-(7) hold for all β ∈ [β∗,1).
Proof of Lemma 3. In Appendix.
The proof of the Lemma reveals that the key participation constraint
is the buyer’s. In equilibrium, if the buyer pays a seller — which occurs if
β is suﬃciently large — then it is also true that the seller serves the buyer.
The reverse, however, is not true.
Lemma 4 (Large economies). Monetary trade is not an equilibrium as
N → ∞.
Proof of Lemma 4. In Appendix.
Intuitively, in large economies buyers prefer to avoid paying because
they can immediately consume, cannot be immediately punished, and can
spend their money in the future. This destroys the value of money. The
18conclusion is that monetary equilibrium cannot generally be sustained when
monitoring and punishment limitations preclude adequate enforcement—
external or not. This is true for the same reason it is true for social norms:
in equilibrium individuals voluntarily sustain a loss to provide a beneﬁt to
others only if group punishment is a signiﬁcant threat. In the next section,
we study the credibility of the threat, by considering the incentives to
punish oﬀ-equilibrium.
3.2 Oﬀ-equilibrium deviations
Community enforcement is credible if actions in the punishment phase are
individually optimal. Deviating in non-monetary matches is suboptimal
(the deviator has a loss and cannot slow down contagion). However, a
defector might wish to deviate in a monetary match, to slow down the
contagious spread of punishment. We study this case.
Suppose there are k ≥ 2 defectors, and agent i is one of them. Let ˆ vj(k)
denote i’s payoﬀ when he has j = 0,1 tokens. Deviating is suboptimal if
ˆ vj(k) ≤ vj(k).
To derive these continuation payoﬀs, consider that the expected payoﬀs
from not punishing depend on the probabilities of meeting a defector with
and without money.
Consider defector i when he does not have money. Conditional on k′
19being the state next period and k currently, let µ0
kk′ denote the probability
that oi(t) is a buyer with money and δ0
kk′ the conditional probability that
oi(t) is a defecting buyer with money, so
α
0
kk′ + δ
0
kk′ = µ
0
kk′, and
N ∑
k′=k
Qkk′µ
0
kk′ = m0 for all k ≥ 2.
Similarly, consider defector i when he has money. Let µ1
kk′ denote the
conditional probability that oi(t) is a seller without money, and δ1
kk′ the
probability that oi(t) is a defecting seller without money. Hence, we have
α
1
kk′ + δ
1
kk′ = µ
1
kk′, and
N ∑
k′=k
Qkk′µ
1
kk′ = 1 − m1 for all k ≥ 2.
Using a recursive formulation, we have
ˆ v0(k) =
N ∑
k′=k
Qkk′α
0
kk′[d − l + βv1(k
′ − 1)] +
N ∑
k′=k
Qkk′δ
0
kk′[d − l + v0(k
′)]
+
N ∑
k′=k
Qkk′(1 − µ
0
kk′)[d + βv0(k
′)],
ˆ v1(k) =
N ∑
k′=k
Qkk′α
1
kk′[g + βv0(k
′ − 1)] +
N ∑
k′=k
Qkk′δ
1
kk′[d + βv0(k
′)]
+
N ∑
k′=k
Qkk′(1 − µ
1
kk′)[d + βv1(k
′)].
To derive these expressions note that i deviates only in a monetary match.
If i has no money, then we consider ˆ v0(k). The ﬁrst line accounts for the
cases in which i is in a monetary match (i.e., a seller). Here, the agent
earns d−l because he cooperates instead of punishing. Player i might also
receive money, but this depends on whether his opponent (who is a buyer
with money) cooperates or defects. If his opponent is a cooperator, then i’s
20continuation payoﬀ is v1(k′ − 1), because this cooperator does not become
a defector (i cooperates) and gives money to i. Otherwise, we have v0(k′)
because there is no impact on the number of future defectors and i does
not receive money.
The second line deﬁnes matches in which i is not in a monetary match.
The probability of not meeting a buyer with money can be decomposed as
1 − m0 =
N ∑
k′=k
Qkk′(1 − µ
0
kk′),
because, conditional on transitioning from k to k′, the probability of not
meeting a buyer with money is 1−µ0
kk′. In all these matches player i earns d
and does not receive money so the continuation payoﬀ is v0(k′), depending
on the realization of k′.
If i has money, instead, then we consider ˆ v1(k). Here agent i deviates
only when he is in a monetary match (i.e., a buyer), which is reported in
the ﬁrst line. Deviating means that i transfers money instead of keeping it.
If his opponent is a cooperator, then i earns g and the continuation payoﬀ
is v0(k′ − 1) because his opponent does not observe a defection; otherwise
i earns d and gets v0(k′) continuation payoﬀ. The second line refers to the
matches that are not monetary.
Now, we use the deﬁnitions of vj(k), for k = 2,...,N, to derive inequal-
ities that guarantee that single-period deviations are not proﬁtable, out of
equilibrium. Deviating from punishment in a monetary match is subopti-
21mal for defector i, when i is a buyer, if ˆ v1(k) ≤ v1(k), which is rewritten
as
N ∑
k′=k
Qkk′α
1
kk′[v0(k
′ − 1) − v1(k
′)] ≤
N ∑
k′=k
Qkk′δ
1
kk′[v1(k
′) − v0(k
′)], (8)
by manipulating expressions v1(k) and ˆ v1(k) and using the fact that α1
kk′ +
δ1
kk′ = µ1
kk′.
Lemma 5 (Buyers punish). Inequality (8) holds for all β ∈ (0,1).
Proof of Lemma 5. In Appendix.
Out of equilibrium, it is never optimal for a buyer to deviate from the
punishment strategy. The reason is simple. Suppose buyer i today pays
the seller, when in fact he should not. Paying the seller may slow down
the growth in the number of defectors but agent i cannot beneﬁt from it
until he re-acquires money. Hence, since future payoﬀs are discounted, it
is a dominant strategy to not pay out of equilibrium.
Deviating from punishment in a monetary match is suboptimal for de-
fector i, when i is a seller, if ˆ v0(k) ≤ v0(k). Using α0
kk′ + δ0
kk′ = µ0
kk′, the
inequality is
β
N ∑
k′=k
Qkk′α
0
kk′[v1(k
′ − 1) − v1(k
′)] ≤ l
N ∑
k′=k
Qkk′µ
0
kk′. (9)
Lemma 6 (Sellers punish). There exists 0 ≤ l∗ < g − d such that if
l ∈ [l∗,g − d), then inequality (9) holds for all β ∈ (0,1).
Proof of Lemma 6. In Appendix
22Out of equilibrium, cooperating as a seller may slow down the growth in
defectors. This beneﬁts the seller because he acquires money and may be
able to spend it tomorrow. To remove the incentive to deviate, the seller’s
loss from making a unilateral transfer must be suﬃciently high.
4 Final remarks
Can money overcome trade frictions when voluntary trading arrangements
cannot? It can—according to current thinking—because monetary sys-
tems operate independently of institutions designed to monitor behaviors
and sanction undesirable ones. Conceptually, money exists because of a
lack of enforcement in society. This view hinges on a routine assumption
that money embodies a technology, which prevents players from suﬀering
losses—a technology to enforce property rights, perhaps.
We have proved that without some enforcement hard-wired into the
model, monetary exchange is aﬄicted by the same problems that under-
mine norms of voluntary behavior. The analysis can be extended to prove
that when rules of voluntary behavior support intertemporal exchange,
monetary exchange may not. The take-away is that monetary systems do
need institutions designed to monitor behaviors and sanction undesirable
ones. Money and enforcement are complementary institutions, not substi-
tutes, after all.
So what explains the widespread use of money in society? It may be
a consequence of the kind of enforcement it requires, which is perhaps less
costly, less cognitively demanding, or behaviorally more eﬀective compared
to that needed to sustain alternative trading arrangements. Recent experi-
mental work on indeﬁnitely repeated social dilemmas suggests that oppor-
tunistic temptations are not easily deterred by community enforcement,
whereas costly personal punishment is quite eﬀective [2]. Moreover, when
23external enforcement of monetary spot trades is available, ﬁat monetary ex-
change endogenously emerges and empirically outperforms non-monetary
outcomes even if rules of voluntary behavior can theoretically sustain in-
tertemporal exchange [3, 4].
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25Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. The deﬁnition of vj immediately implies
v0 =
[(1 − m1)g + m1d]m0β + (d − m0l)(1 − m1β)
(1 − β)[1 + β(m0 − m1)]
,
v1 =
[(1 − m1)g + m1d][1 − (1 − m0)β] + (d − m0l)(1 − m1)β
(1 − β)[1 + β(m0 − m1)]
,
hence we have
v1 − v0 =
(1 − m1)(g − d) + m0l
1 + β(m0 − m1)
> 0.
This diﬀerence is positive because m0−m1 ≥ −1, and it reﬂects the diﬀer-
ence in expected trade surpluses. With probability 1−m1 someone with a
token earns surplus g−d and with probability m1 earns no surplus. Some-
one without a token earns a surplus −l with probability m0 and no surplus
otherwise. The denominator is an adjusted discount factor.
The outcome corresponding to inﬁnite repetition of the static Nash
equilibrium (every seller always chooses D) is always an equilibrium of
the repeated game. Call this equilibrium “autarky” since every player is
idle in each period and obtains payoﬀ va := d
1−β. Note v0 ≥ d
1−β, iﬀ
β ≥ βm = l
(1−m1)(g−d)+m1l, with βm < 1 since g − d > l > 0.
Proof of Lemma 3. Start by considering deviations by a buyer in a mon-
etary match, i.e., (7), which is satisﬁed if v0−v1(2) ≥ 0. Using the deﬁnition
of v1(k) in (5) we have
v1(2) =
d
1 − β
+
1
1 − β
ϕ2(g − d).
26Hence,
v0 − v1(2) =
(1 − β)v0 − d
1 − β
−
ϕ2(g − d)
1 − β
.
Using the deﬁnition of v0 in (1) we have
(1 − β)v0 − d ≡
βm0(1 − m1)(g − d) − m0l(1 − βm1)
1 + β(m0 − m1)
> 0 if β > βm,
lim
β→1−
(1 − β)v0 − d
1 − β
= ∞.
By [5, Theorem 3] lim
β→1−
ϕ2
1 − β
< ∞. Hence, by continuity β∗ ∈ (βm,1)
exists such that v0 − v1(2) ≥ 0 for β ∈ [β∗,1).
Now, consider deviations by a seller in a monetary match. Inequality
(6) is satisﬁed if β[v1 − v1(2)] ≥ l. From the deﬁnition of v0 and v1 in (1)
we have
β(v1 − v0) ≡ β
(1 − m1)(g − d) + m0l
1 + β(m0 − m1)
≥ βm
(1 − m1)(g − d) + m0l
1 + βm(m0 − m1)
≡ l for β ≥ βm.
Now ﬁx β ∈ [β∗,1) so that v0 ≥ v1(2). Consequently v1−v1(2) ≥ v1−v0 ≥
l/β, i.e., inequality (6) is also satisﬁed when β ∈ [β∗,1).
Proof of Lemma 4. We have to simply show that buyers do not wish to
pay in economies that are “large.” To deﬁne a large economy, let M = bN
for b ∈ (0,1) and let N → ∞. That is, we ﬁx a per-capita money supply
and let the economy grow large.
Consider a defector who is a buyer in a monetary match, out of equi-
librium when there are k ≥ 2 defectors. Since the number of defectors is
ﬁnite, the unconditional probability that the buyer is in a monetary match
27with a seller who is a cooperator is lim
N→∞σk =
1
2
(1 − b). Hence, we have
lim
N→∞ϕ2 = lim
N→∞(1 − β)e
T
2(I − βQ)
−1σ = (1 − β)
∞ ∑
j=2
(I − βQ)
−1
2j lim
N→∞σj
=
1
2
(1 − b)(1 − β)
∞ ∑
j=2
(I − βQ)
−1
2j =
1
2
(1 − b),
where (I −βQ)
−1
2j denotes element in row 2 column j of matrix (I −βQ)−1;
(I − βQ)
−1
21 = 0 because Q is upper triangular.
Recall that a buyer does not deviate in equilibrium if (7) holds, i.e., if
v0 − v1(2) ≥ 0. But this is violated for all β ∈ (0,1) as N → ∞. To see
this note that
lim
N→∞[v0 − v1(2)] = lim
N→∞
[
(1 − β)v0 − d
1 − β
−
ϕ2(g − d)
1 − β
]
= −
[2 − β(1 + b)][(g − d)(1 − b) + bl]
2(1 − β)(2 − β)
< 0.
Proof of Lemma 5. We prove by contradiction that v1(k) ≥ v0(k), for
all k = 2,...,N.
Suppose v1(h) < v0(h) for some 2 ≤ h ≤ N. Use the deﬁnition of v0(k)
in (2) and notice that vj(k) ≥ vj(k+1) for j = 0,1 and all k = 2,...,N−1.9
9Suppose there exists a k such that vj(k) < vj(k + 1) for j = 0,1. This means that
in the economy starting with one more defector, any defector is more likely to meet a
cooperator. But this cannot be true, as it contradicts the properties of the transition
matrix Q as in [5, Theorem 1].
28We have
v0(h) = d + β
N ∑
k′=h
Qhk′α
0
hk′v1(k
′) + β
N ∑
k′=h
Qhk′(1 − α
0
hk′)v0(k
′)
< d + βv1(h)
N ∑
k′=h
Qhk′α
0
hk′ + βv0(h)
N ∑
k′=h
Qhk′(1 − α
0
hk′)
< d + βv0(h)
N ∑
k′=h
Qhk′α
0
hk′ + βv0(h)
N ∑
k′=h
Qhk′(1 − α
0
hk′)
= d + βv0(h),
which provides the desired contradiction because v0(k) ≥
d
1 − β
for all
k = 2,...,N.
Consider inequality (8). We prove that it holds whenever v1(k) ≥ v0(k−
1), for all k = 2,...,N. Using the deﬁnition of v0(k) in (2) we have
v0(k) = d + β
N ∑
k′=k
Qkk′v0(k
′) + β
N ∑
k′=k
Qkk′α
0
kk′(v1(k
′) − v0(k
′))
= d + β
N ∑
k′=k
Qkk′v0(k
′) + β
N ∑
k′=k+1
Qkk′α
0
kk′(v1(k
′) − v0(k
′))
≤ d + β
N ∑
k′=k
Qkk′v0(k
′) + β
N ∑
k′=k+1
Qkk′(v1(k
′) − v0(k
′))
= d + βQkkv0(k) + β
N ∑
k′=k+1
Qkk′v1(k
′)
≤ d + βQkkv0(k) + β(1 − Qkk)v1(k + 1).
To derive the second line we have used the fact that α0
kk′ = 0 when k′ = k.
For the third line note that α0
kk′ ≤ 1. The fourth line follows
N ∑
k′=k+1
Qkk′v1(k
′) ≤ v1(k + 1)
N ∑
k′=k+1
Qkk′ = v1(k + 1)(1 − Qkk).
Since
v1(k + 1) ≥
1 − βQkk
β(1 − βQkk)
v0(k) −
d
β(1 − Qkk)
,
29we have
v1(k) − v0(k − 1) ≥
1 − βQk−1,k−1
β(1 − Qk−1,k−1)
v0(k − 1) −
d
β(1 − Qk−1,k−1)
− v0(k − 1)
=
1 − β
β(1 − Qk−1,k−1)
v0(k − 1) −
d
β(1 − Qk−1,k−1)
≥
1 − β
β(1 − Qk−1,k−1)
d
1 − β
−
d
β(1 − Qk−1,k−1)
= 0.
The last line follows from v0(k) ≥ v0(N) =
d
1 − β
for all k = 2,...,N.
Proof of Lemma 6. Consider inequality (9). We derive an expression
for v1(k − 1) − v1(k) when k = 2,...,N. From the deﬁnition of v1(k) in
(5), for all k = 2,...,N
v1(k − 1) − v1(k) = (g − d)
1
1 − β
(ϕk−1 − ϕk). (10)
By [5, Theorem 3] we have lim
β→1−
ϕk
1 − β
< ∞. Hence, (9) holds whenever l
is suﬃciently large. To ensure that the parameter set is nonempty we take
a second step.
By [5, Theorem 3] we have ϕk − ϕk+1 ≤ ϕk−1 − ϕk for all k = 2,...,N.
So, we have
v1(k − 1) − v1(k) ≤ v1(1) − v1(2) = (g − d)
1
1 − β
(ϕ1 − ϕ2).
We wish to prove that
β(ϕ1 − ϕ2)
1 − β
< 1, hence a value l∗ < g − d exists,
which satisﬁes (9). From equation (5) in Lemma 2 we have
v1(1) =
1
1 − β
[ϕ1g + (1 − ϕ1)d].
By deﬁnition of v1(1), we also have
v1(1) = σ1g + (1 − σ1)d + βv1(2)
= σ1g + (1 − σ1)d +
β
1 − β
[ϕ2g + (1 − ϕ2)d],
30where we have used equation (5) for v1(2). Hence, we must have
1
1 − β
[ϕ1g + (1 − ϕ1)d] = σ1g + (1 − σ1)d +
β
1 − β
[ϕ2g + (1 − ϕ2)d],
which is rewritten as
ϕ1 − βϕ2
1 − β
= σ1.
Recall that σ1 = 1 (if there is only one defector, then the defector meets a
cooperator with certainty) and β(ϕ1−ϕ2) < ϕ1−βϕ2, hence
β(ϕ1 − ϕ2)
1 − β
<
1.
Finally, note that inequality (9) is the most stringent when k = 2, and
in this case it can be rewritten as
(g − d)
1
m0
β
1 − β
N ∑
k′=2
Q2k′α
0
2k′(ϕk′−1 − ϕk′) ≤ l,
which is achieved by substituting on the right hand side
N ∑
k′=2
Q2k′µ0
2k′ = m0
and by substituting in the diﬀerence v1(k′−1)−v1(k′) the expressions v1(k)
given in Lemma 2. Now deﬁne
γ := sup
β∈(0,1)
N ∑
k′=2
Q2k′α
0
2k′
β
1 − β
(ϕk′−1 − ϕk′).
Note that γ < m0 because
β(ϕk′−1 − ϕk′)
1 − β
< 1 for all β. Hence, deﬁning
l
∗ := (g − d)
γ
m0
,
inequality (9) holds for all β ∈ (0,1) if l is in [l∗,g − d).
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